A lot has been said as of late about the state of the Pirates and their prospects. The questions that are typically asked are:
- Are they bad evaluators?
- Are they bad at developing talent?
- Is it the system they use to develop?
- Is it the team’s management?
- Is it coaching across the system?
Casual and non-casual fans alike truly do not know. Therefore, it needs to be looked at logically, by looking at how the Pirates fair against their division rivals. Each organization will be graded on their evaluation skills, development skills, and their luck. The measurements to be used will be as follows:
- # of Drafted players signed by the organization that drafts them to make the MLB
- Evaluated WAR, Career to date. This is the total WAR for everyone drafted and signed by the team.
- Developed War, Career to date. This is the total WAR for everyone drafted and signed by the team. However, only the WAR accumulated while playing for said team is tabulated.
- Free Agent War, season. This is the total WAR for anyone acquired through free agency. This is counted each season regardless of when the free agent was signed.
- Traded for WAR, season. This is the total WAR for anyone who was acquired via trade. This is counted each season regardless of when the trade was consummated.
- Developed WAR, season. This is the total WAR for anyone acquired via Amateur Draft, Amateur Free Agency, Rule 5 draft, or claimed off waivers. This only counts for the WAR accrued in each season, regardless of when drafted or signed.
The timeframe for this will start with the 2008 draft and run through the 2020 draft, which was the shortened Covid draft. First a look at the data across each team over the timeframe as well as how they rank:
| Team | # of Draftees to make MLB | Evaluated Draft WAR Career to Date | Developed Draft WAR Career to Date | Free Agent WAR Season | Traded for WAR Season | Developed WAR Season | Total WAR Season | Total Team Record |
| Chicago Cubs | 69 | 117.4 | 66.9 | 54 | 110.4 | 229.7 | 355 | 958-1046 |
| Cincinnati Reds | 67 | 192.9 | 94.5 | 134.3 | 156.5 | 149.8 | 432.2 | 1031-971 |
| Milwaukee Brewers | 69 | 157.6 | 75.2 | 58 | 119.9 | 197.8 | 375.7 | 1023-982 |
| Pittsburgh Pirates | 77 | 216 | 58.4 | 33.2 | 97.4 | 165 | 296.1 | 940-1061 |
| St. Louis Cardinals | 83 | 271.6 | 185 | 112.1 | 97.3 | 272.8 | 482.2 | 1106-896 |
| Team | # of Draftees to make MLB | Evaluated Draft WAR Career to Date | Developed Draft WAR Career to Date | Free Agent WAR Season | Traded for WAR Season | Developed WAR Season | Total WAR Season | Average Ranking |
| Chicago Cubs | #5 | #3 | #2 | #1 | #1 | #5 | #2 | 2.7 |
| Cincinnati Reds | #3-T | #5 | #4 | #5 | #3 | #2 | #4 | 3.7 |
| Milwaukee Brewers | #3-T | #4 | #3 | #3 | #2 | #3 | #3 | 3 |
| Pittsburgh Pirates | #2 | #2 | #5 | #4 | #4 | #4 | #5 | 3.7 |
| St. Louis Cardinals | #1 | #1 | #1 | #2 | #5 | #1 | #1 | 1.7 |
As you look at the data points across the division, the first thing that stands out is that the Pirates hold the worst record in the Central over that timeframe. They also rank worst or second worst in all categories except two: the number of draftees to reach the majors and evaluated draft WAR. The number of draftees to make the Majors makes sense for the Pirates to be ranked highly in. Having such poor records and teams over this timeframe allows for more players to be called up to the big-league squad. Sadly, it is also cheaper to call up one’s own players from the minors than to spend money in FA. The one gold star for the Pirates is that they rank only behind the Cardinals for best Evaluators via the draft in the NLC. This could have potentially been even better had they signed Trea Turner when they drafted him in the Josh Bell draft. The question becomes why are the Pirates ranked so low? and how can it be fixed? If it can be fixed.
Pittsburgh Pirates:
| Year | Top Pick | # of Draftees to make MLB | Evaluated Draft WAR Career to Date | Developed Draft WAR Career to Date | Free Agent WAR Season | Traded for WAR Season | Developed WAR Season | Total WAR Season | Team Record |
| 2008 | Pedro Alvarez | 6 | 28.1 | 11.1 | 1.2 | 6 | 7.8 | 15 | 67-95 |
| 2009 | Tony Sanchez | 5 | 7.1 | -0.2 | 1.1 | 8.7 | 7.1 | 17 | 62-99 |
| 2010 | Jameson Taillon | 5 | 12.1 | 6.3 | -1.5 | -1.3 | 5.8 | 3 | 57-105 |
| 2011 | Gerrit Cole | 6 | 63.1 | 11.4 | -1.2 | 10.9 | 10.2 | 19.9 | 72-90 |
| 2012 | Mark Appel | 5 | 8.5 | 6.4 | 2.6 | 6.7 | 16.8 | 26.1 | 79-83 |
| 2013 | Austin Meadows | 8 | 26.5 | 12.8 | 6.3 | 8.7 | 25.2 | 40.2 | 94-68 |
| 2014 | Cole Tucker | 7 | 5.2 | .5 | 8.4 | 8.8 | 21.1 | 38.3 | 88-74 |
| 2015 | Kevin Newmann | 9 | 13.4 | 14.4 | 5.5 | 7.8 | 27.4 | 40.7 | 98-64 |
| 2016 | Will Craig | 7 | -4.5 | -2.5 | 8.2 | 5.5 | 14.1 | 27.8 | 78-83 |
| 2017 | Shane Baz | 9 | -2.1 | -2.4 | 2.5 | 7.8 | 12.9 | 23.2 | 75-87 |
| 2018 | Travis Swaggerty | 5 | -1.4 | -1.2 | 2.9 | 14.7 | 13.3 | 30.9 | 82-79 |
| 2019 | Quinn Priester | 3 | 1.4 | 1.2 | -0.2 | 12 | 3.5 | 15.7 | 69-93 |
| 2020 | Nick Gonzales | 2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | -2.6 | 1.1 | -0.2 | -1.7 | 19-41 |
| Totals | 77 | 216 | 58.4 | 33.2 | 97.4 | 165 | 296.1 | 940-1061 |
A quick look at the top pick column shows one of the issues the Pirates have suffered with over the last few decades. Top Picks have not stayed in Pittsburgh, and most have not ended up being big-time players. Looking over the list, it’s clear that the best players are Jameson Taillon and Gerrit Cole and both might have had their best years outside of Pittsburgh. A number of them would be considered busts: Tony Sanchez, Cole Tucker, Kevin Newmann, Will Craig, and Travis Swaggerty. And one, Mark Appel, didn’t even sign with the Pirates. This all aside, they still had the 2nd best evaluation score in the Central division. This points to the fact that Pirates are either, drafting strong in the earlier or middle rounds, or finding diamonds in the rough. However, as it then transitions to development the Pirates go from 2nd best to 2nd worst. Only 27% of their evaluated WAR has produced that WAR while playing on the Pirates, meaning that the Pirates are trading, not resigning or releasing the players before getting the best out of those players. For example, St. Louis has a 68% rate of Evaluated to Developed WAR. The problem that most will point to, correctly, is that the Pirates are “cheap” and will trade players before big paydays. Or release aging players in order to not give them a “fair market” contract. This trend has bucked the last few years as big extensions have been given to Bryan Reynolds, Ke’Bryan Hayes, and Mitch Keller. However, fans will also remember extensions given out once upon a time to Andrew McCutchen, Starling Marte, Jose Tabata, and Gregory Polanco; however, the difference in scope length and dollar amount is evident. But the Pirates did fail to sign previous high-end talents like Jameson Taillon or Gerrit Cole. Outside of internal talent, the Pirates have shown an ineptitude with bringing in external help as well.
Pirates rank 2nd worst in both Free Agent WAR and Traded for WAR. Only three seasons saw a 10 or great WAR from traded for players. Furthermore, only two seasons were over 8 WAR and four of the seasons had negative WAR for Free Agency. So, the Pirates have been poor in bringing in free agents as well as trading for players. The two notable exceptions during this time frame were AJ Burnett on the trade side and Russell Martin on the free agency side. A big part of the issue with free agency is that the Pirates have not been a good team for the majority of this timeframe, meaning that players are less likely to want to play in Pittsburgh unless they are getting more than what other teams are paying. This brings us to the other issue: the Pirates are cheap. It creates a maddening catch-22 where the Pirates won’t pay for free agents, and then, free agents don’t want to come to Pittsburgh because the team isn’t good. That is unless they get paid to do so, which the Pirates will not do. Furthermore, the trades that the Pirates complete are not always for big-name players. Take the highest WAR total of 14.7 in 2018: the majority of that WAR came from Trevor Williams (3.8), Felipe Vazquez (1.5), Kyle Crick (1.5), Corey Dickerson (3.6) and Francisco Cervelli (2.9). None of these players were players that either lasted long or were perennially dominant. Again, failures on the trade and free agent fronts are evident from the data collected on the Pirates. This becomes even more clear when you look at Developed vs Total WAR season by season.
When you look at the totals over the timeframe you realize that 56% of the collective seasons WAR was from Development. Which is fine if you are drafting the right players. For example, the Cardinals percentage is 57% just one point ahead of the Pirates; however, the overall total WAR by St. Louis is 65% higher than the Pirates. So, while the percentage might be roughly the same the overall numbers are vastly different. This all points to that season to season they are not able to put the right combination of players together on the field together to be competitive. All of this brings us back to the questions posed at the top.
- Are they bad evaluators?
A: No, by the metrics they have evaluated very well when it comes to the draft. The caveat is that some of their first picks in the draft have not performed to that level. - Are they bad at developing talent?
A: Possibly. They do not develop as well as the other NLC teams. Furthermore, there tends to be a trend where some of the drafted players have their best seasons outside of Pittsburgh. - Is it the system they use to develop?
A: Yes. There have been countless problems with the Pirates development programs, Hokey-Hey. Also, there have been recent, unfounded, reports of an increase in severe injuries amongst Pirate players. - Is it the team’s management?
A: Yes. There have been some clear issues with both managers and general managers over this time period. While not all can be laid at their feet, there are a lot of accountabilities that fall at the feet of those two positions. - Is it coaching across the system?
A: Unknown. A few years ago, they lost an up-and-coming pitching coach due to unknown reasons. This past year they moved on from a well-respected coach due to “reasons”. Considering how the players have performed at those levels and once they have reached the MLB, there is some blame that can be placed on coaching across the system.
In the end. It comes down to money. As it always does. If the Pirates can get better at how they spend their money and at spending that money in Free Agency, then they should start to turn it around overall. Furthermore, putting a focus on coaching across the system would be ideal. The more cohesive that group can be the better the transition for players as they progress through the system. All in all, there is work that needs to be done. Hopefully, the owner is willing to put that work, and that money, into the organization.

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